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RESOLVING NORTH AMERICA'S
ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES
Mike Mauseth*
I. INTRODUCTION

Seventeen years ago John E. Carroll and Newell B. Mack analyzed
the then-current status of environmental protection mechanisms used
between Canada and the United States.' They criticized the ad hoc nature of North America's history of environmental dispute resolution,
which they dubbed "ad hockery," 2 and believed the present ambiguity
3
hurt business, diplomatic relations, and the citizenry's environment.
Since that publication, increasing efforts to incorporate environmental
concerns into Conventions have resulted in several multilateral agreements focusing on environmental protection and dispute resolution.
Part Two of this paper will introduce a few of these recent agreements
and the mechanisms they have established to monitor environmental
damage and to enforce the goals of the agreements. The agreements
discussed include: Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer; 4 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer; 5 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; 6 Basel
Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and their Disposal; 7 Canada-United States: Agreement on Air
Quality; 8 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; 9 Frame" Pursuing J.D./M.A.

at the University of Denver College of Law and the University

of Denver Graduate School of International Studies. The author would like to thank Professor Ved P. Nanda for his guidance and Katie Coffey for her insight.
1. John E. Carroll & Newell B. Mack, On Living Together in North America: Canada, the United States and InternationalEnvironmentalRelations, 12 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 35 (1982).
2. Id. at 38.
3. Id. at 39-41. The authors claim that the greatest disadvantage of the ad hoc approach is the loss of predictability where each Party to a dispute is a potential loser and
thus has less incentive to raise criticism. Id. at 41.
4. Reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987). For adjustments and amendments to the
Montreal Protocol, see 31 I.L.M 874 (1993).
5. Reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1516 (1987).
6. Reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987).
7. Reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1991).
8. Reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 676 (1991).
9. Reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992).
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work Convention on Climate Change;10 Convention on Biological Diversity;11 and the North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera1 2

tion.

Part Three will discuss the general concern related to economic development (with the need to maintain "sustainable development" 3), the
possible environmental impact of NAFTA, and the Supplemental
Agreement's strengths and weaknesses.
II.

SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND THEIR RESPECTIVE
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT/ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORKS

A. Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal
Protocol)
The Montreal Protocol asks the Parties to "take appropriate measures to protect human health and environment against the adverse effects resulting or likely to result from human activities which modify or
14
are likely to modify the ozone layer."'
The protocol requires Parties to reduce their CFC production based
on levels emitted during 1986.15 The Parties, after entering the agreement into force, will report yearly levels of CFC production to the Convention's secretariat who will supervise Parties' compliance with the
Convention's requirements.' 6 The protocol holds that Parties shall ban
trade with non-members who do not comply with the protocol if such
trade involves any of the controlled substances listed within the Convention. 17
10. Reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992).
11. Reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
12. Id.
13. See United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), reprinted in U.N. Document A/CONF.48/14 which states at principle 7 that "economic and social development is essential for ensuring a favorable living and working environment for man and.. . necessary for the improvement of the quality of life." See also
WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 4-5
(1987) (finding that pursuing sustainable development an important aspiration, and the
key aspect in doing so is "the recognition that economic and environmental goals are inextricably linked").
14. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, at 1549. The agreement applies a different standard to developing countries when it states that a "special provision is required to meet
the needs of developing countries for theses substances." Id.
15. Id. art. 2.
16. Id. art. 7. Data collection of CFC production is measured and reported by domestic functionaries. Id. Developing countries are given preferential treatment, they are allowed to exceed such limits if done "in order to meet its basic domestic needs." Id. art. 5.
The developing countries also benefit from a ten-year grace period in fulfilling the requirements of the agreement.
17. Id. art. 4. This includes products produced with, but not containing, certain con-
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The goals of the Montreal Protocol are detailed, giving desirable
levels of CFC production for Parties of the agreement.18 Such detail
disappears when looking for enforcement power or guidance for dispute
resolution under the agreement. 19 The agreement refuses to implement
specific enforcement powers of the Secretariat and mentions no proce20
dure for settling disputes.
B. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
The Convention takes a broad view of adverse effects to the environment, defining it as "changes in the physical environment or biota,
including changes in climate, which have significant deleterious effects
on human health or on the composition, resilience and productivity of
natural and managed ecosystems, or on materials useful to mankind." 21
In preventing such damage, the Convention requires Parties to "take
appropriate measures ... to protect human health and the environment
against adverse effects resulting from human activities which modify or
'22
are likely to modify the ozone layer.
The "appropriate measures" include requiring Parties to engage in
systematic research and observation, to adopt harmonized internal legislation that limits damaging human activities, and to cooperate with
the individual Party-states and international bodies in creating standards and enforcement of this Convention. 23 The Convention, though
requiring coordination of activity, is ever mindful of not usurping domestic sovereignty 24 and the need for a scientific basis for any action. 25
The need for reasonable action motivates the Convention in encouraging the exchange of information. 26 The exchange of information also encourages the transfer of technologies to developing countries through:
(a) the facilitation of developing countries acquiring alternative technologies; (b) the provision of instruction on the alternative technologies;
(c) the provision of required equipment and research; and (d) the provi-

trolled substances. Id.
18. See Annex C of the Montreal Protocol Adjustments and Amendments, supra note
4.
19. Montreal Protocol, supra note 4, art. 8.
20. Id. The reason may be that the Protocol refers to its recognition of the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Id. art. 1.
21. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 5, art. 1.2.
22. Id. art. 2.1.
23. Id. art. 2.2.
24. Id. art. 2.3.
25. Id. art. 2.4.
26. Id. art. 4.1 (suggesting that Parties "facilitate and encourage the exchange of scientific, technical, socio-economic, commercial and legal information" to bodies agreed
upon by the Parties).
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sion of appropriate training of required personnel. 27
The Convention provides an established framework for dispute settlement, requiring Parties to negotiate if a conflict arises about the interpretation or application of the Convention. 28 If the Parties cannot
agree on a solution, a third Party may be requested to preside over the
dispute. 29 If the Parties are still unable to end the conflict, three things
may happen: (a) the dispute may go to arbitration; (b) the dispute may
be heard and decided by the International Court of Justice; or (c) a conciliation commission may be created (with equal members appointed by
the separate Parties) which will deliver the final award. 30 No specific
enforcement powers are granted through the Convention, but the final
judgments and recommendations on the disputes must be "considered
31
in good faith" by the Parties.
C. The Global Convention on the Control of TransboundaryMovements
of Hazardous Waste (Basel Convention)
The Convention serves to protect neighboring environments of
waste producing Parties by prohibiting the exportation of hazardous
wastes to non-consenting neighboring states. 32 The Convention goes
farther by: requiring Parties to minimize the creation of hazardous
wastes within their own domestic boundaries; ensuring proper disposal
facilities are located in the domestic territory; having proper management and procedure to deal with the hazardous wastes; and reporting
33
the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes.
The Convention emphasizes the need for Party cooperation to better handle environmental waste. 34 To do this, the Convention requires
Parties to: (a) harmonize technical standards and practices "for the
adequate management of hazardous waste and other waste"; (b) cooperate in monitoring the effects of hazardous waste management on hu27. Id. art. 4.2. The Convention makes clear that transferring technology must be in
compliance with the domestic laws of the transferring Parties. Id.
28. Id. art. 11.1.
29. Id. art. 11.2. The direction which the dispute will go depends on whether the Parties involved have authorized the ICJ or arbitration proceedings to rule over their case.
This is done by writing a declaration to the Convention's Depository that such proceedings are allowable. Id. art. 11.3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be
the Depository of this Convention. Id. art. 20.1.
30. Id. art. 11.
31. Id. art. 11.5.
32. Basel Convention, supra note 7. The preamble recognizes the idea that "hazardous wastes and other wastes should, as far is compatible with environmentally sound and
efficient management, be disposed of in the State where they were generated."
33. Id. art. 4. The state of export may export the waste after it has received written
confirmation from the receiving state which contains a contract for the "environmentally
sound management of the wastes in question." Id. art. 6.3.
34. Id. art. 10.1.
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man health and the environment; (c) develop and implement low-waste
35
technologies; and (d) transfer the technologies to developing countries.
Dispute resolution under the Basel Convention encourages Parties,
in case of a dispute over the interpretation, application, or compliance
with the provisions in the Convention, to settle the dispute through any
peaceful means of the Parties' choice.3 6 If this consensual resolution
fails to work, the Parties may allow the dispute go before the International Court of Justice or to arbitration. 37 If the Parties cannot agree to
either of these destinations, they are still required to seek resolution of
38
the dispute.
The Convention sets out a detailed list of procedures for arbitration
which will be in effect if both Parties agree to a forum for dispute settlement. 39 A tribunal, consisting of three members, will be established
to settle the dispute. 40 Each Party appoints one arbitrator and the two
appointees agree on a third arbitrator who is not a national of either
Party. 41 The decisions of the tribunal are decided by a majority of votes
and the arbitrators may engage in any reasonable fact-finding that they
deem necessary to make a decision. 42 The tribunal is not given explicit
sanctioning or enforcement power, but the Convention requires the Par43
ties to consider the final decision as binding and final.
D. Canada-United States: Agreement on Air Quality
The agreement begins by proclaiming that air pollution can cause
"significant harm to natural resources of vital environmental, cultural
and economic importance, and to human health." 44 To combat such
harm, the agreement lists both general and specific air quality objectives for both nations to meet. The general objective controls transboundary air pollution between Canada and the United States, 45 and
includes the following steps: (a) establishing specific emissions limita35. Id. art. 10.2. All domestic laws must be upheld while fulfilling the requirements
of this treaty. Id.
36. Id. art. 20.1.
37. Id. art. 20.2-.3. The Parties may consent to either forum when they ratify, accept,
approve, confirm, or accede to the Convention (or any time after that). Id.
38. Without both Parties agreeing to the ICJ or arbitration, they are left to their own
peaceful devices to settle the dispute. Id.
39. Id. at Annex VI.
40. Id. at Annex VI, art. 3.
41. Id. at Annex VI, art. 3. If the two appointed arbitrators cannot agree on a third
arbitrator, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, at the request of either Party,
will appoint the third arbitrator. Id. at Annex VI, art. 4.
42. Id. at Annex VI, art. 6. The absence or default of a Party in the dispute will not
hinder the effectiveness or validity of the tribunal's proceedings. Id.
43. Id. at Annex VI, art. 10.2.
44. Canada-United States: Agreement on Air Quality, supra note 8.
45. Id. art. 3.2.
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tions or reductions of air pollutants and the adoption of programs to
implement such standards; 46 (b) beginning environmental impact assessments, prior notification, and mitigation efforts; 47 (c) maintaining
coordinated scientific research and technical activities, including the
exchange of information; 48 and (d) creating dispute resolution and assessment institutions. 49 The agreement also formed the Air Quality
51
Committee 50 that will be kept apprised of pertinent issues.
If a dispute arises over the implementation or interpretation of the
52
agreement, the Parties must negotiate at the request of either Party.
If the Parties cannot resolve their dispute by negotiating they may elect
the International Joint Commission 53 (IJC) to settle the conflict. If Parties cannot agree to the IJC presiding over the dispute, they must sub54
mit to another agreed on form of dispute resolution.
E. Rio Declarationon Environment and Development
Though not a Convention with binding requirements on signatories, the Rio Declaration 55 demonstrates the significance of the environment to the global community and highlights the concern of North
America 56 in protecting the environment. The declaration begins by reiterating the point that nations have the sovereign right to exploit their
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental
policies coupled with the responsibility not to damage other nations' environments "or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."' 57 This
46. Id. art. 3.2(a). Each Party must follow its domestic laws when considering to undertake an environmental impact statement. Id. art. 5.1. Either Party may consult with
the other when any domestic activity (either industrial or legislative) may have a significant affect to transboundary pollution. Id. art. 5.3. If either Party becomes aware of a air
pollution problem which affects both nations, the aware Party must notify and consult
with the other Party. Id. art. 5.6.
47. Id. art. 3.2(b).
48. Id. art. 3.2(c).
49. Id. art. 3.2(e).
50. Id. art. 8.
51. The Committee will gather joint information on monitoring emissions, technologies for controlling emissions, atmospheric processes and effects of air pollutants. Id. art.
7.1. The Commission will not release the provided information unless authorized to do so
by the informing Party. Id. art. 7.2.
52. Id. art. 13. The negotiations must begin within ninety days from the date of request, unless otherwise agreed to by the Parties. Id.
53. Id. art. 13.2. The IJC is a mechanism of the Boundary Waters Treaty, of which
both Canada and the United States are Parties.
54. Id.
55. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, supra note 9.
56. Canada, Mexico, and the United States are Parties to the Declaration.
57. Id. at Principle 2. This is the idea of state sovereignty combined with the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas ("one should use one's own property in such a
manner as not to injure that of another") as enshrined in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,
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exercise in sovereignty balances with several international principles
58
that intertwine environmental protection with economic development.
The burden placed upon developing countries, though not as heavy as
the developed nations, requires acknowledgment of the developing
countries' responsibilities to the global environment in pursuing sustainable development. 59 As part of preventing unjustified environmental degradation, the declaration outlines several procedures, including: (a) public awareness and public access to information activities
in their communities (including the opportunity for public participation
in the-decision-making process); 60 (b) the enactment of effective domestic environmental legislation; 61 (c) promoting the internalization of environmental costs; 62 and (d) the use of environmental impact assessments for proposed activities "that are likely to have a significant
63
adverse impact on the environment."
F. Framework Convention on Climate Change
The Convention's objective is to stabilize the concentrations of
greenhouse gases at such a level so as to not pose a threat to the climate system. 64 The level of concentration would allow natural climate
adaptation by ecosystems yet ensure both adequate food production and
sustainable economic development. 65 Parties should protect the climate
system for future generations 66 and take precautionary measures to
"anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects." 67 In pursuit of the Convention's objectives and
principles, the Parties have committed to several programs, which include: (a) publishing and updating national inventories of anthropo-

supra note 13.
58. See id. at Principle 3 ("the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations");
Principle 4 ("environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it").
59. Id. at Principle 7 ("States have common but differentiated responsibilities").
60. Id. at Principle 10.
61. Id. at Principle 11. The legislation should reflect the "environmental and developmental context to which they apply" and must be relative to the particular situation of
each Party. Id.
62. Id. at Principle 16. This idea goes to the idea that the polluter should bear the
cost of pollution, yet avoiding injuring international trade. Id.
63. Id. at Principle 17.
64. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 10.
65. Id. art. 2.
66. Id. art. 3.1. The Parties' particular development and needs must be considered
when considering the responsibilities placed on the Parties. Id. art 3.2.
67. Id. art. 3.3. The lack of scientific certainty should not be used as an excuse for
postponing implementation of such measures. Id.
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genic emissions by sources; 68 (b) publishing and updating national and
regional programs which mitigate climate change; 69 (c) promoting the
transfer of technologies and cooperation in the development of new
technologies; 70 (d) considering climate change when implementing domestic policies and activities; 71 (e) promoting scientific cooperation in
gathering and analyzing climate system data; 72 and (f) promoting education, training, and public awareness of climate change and the envi73
ronment.
In an effort to coordinate the Parties, the Convention creates institutions to monitor Parties and to facilitate Party action consistent with
the objectives of the Convention. These institutions include: (a) Conference of the Parties, 74 (b) Secretariat,7 5 (c) Subsidiary Body for Scientific
and Technological Advice, 76 and (d) Subsidiary Body for Implementa77
tion.
The Convention requires Parties to attempt to negotiate a resolution to a dispute. 78 If the Parties cannot peacefully resolve the conflict,
the dispute may go before the International Court of Justice and/or to
arbitration under the Convention. 79 If either Party does not consent to
either the ICJ or arbitration for resolution then the Parties have twelve
months to reach an agreement.8 0 If a year passes without a solution the
Conference of the Parties will create a conciliation commission com68. Id. art. 4.1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. art. 7. Their duties include, as supreme body of the Convention, reviewing the
implementation of the Convention, adoption of legal instruments, and facilitating the exchange of information. Id.
75. Id. art. 8. The Secretariat acts as the Convention's administrator; compiling reports and acting as an intermediary between the Subsidiary bodies, the Conference of the
Parties, and the Parties. Id.
76. Id. art. 9. Their duties include assessing scientific knowledge of the Parties, identifying new and efficient technologies, providing scientific programs to encourage international cooperation, and responding to scientific and technical questions asked by the Conference of the Parties and its subsidiary bodies.
77. Id. art. 10. The Body is open to all Parties' participation and considers all information gathered to help the Conference of the Parties determine the level of current implementation and recommendations to further future implementation and compliance.
Id.
78. Id. art. 14. The dispute must concern the interpretation or application of the
Convention. Id.
79. Id. art. 14.2. The Parties may recognize either forum as compulsory ipso facto
and without special agreement when the Parties ratify, accept, approve or accede to the
Convention. Id. Such a recognition shall remain in force until it expires (due to the terms
of the agreement) or until three months after written notification of a Party's revocation
has been deposited. Id. art. 14.3.
80. Id. art. 14.5.
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prised of equal number of members appointed by concerned Parties
with a chairman chosen jointly by the appointed members.8 1 The commission will recommend a decision which the Parties will consider in
82
good faith.
G. Convention on BiologicalDiversity
The objective of the Convention8 3 and the contracting Parties is to
preserve biological diversity8 4 while at the same time maintaining sustainable use8 5 of the environment and encouraging "sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources."86 In order to
achieve this goal the Convention sets out several policies for Parties to
follow, including mechanisms for: (a) the creation or adoption of national programs for the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity;8 7 (b) the identification of components important for biological
diversity and sustainable use;88 (c) the monitoring components important for biological diversity and sustainable use (paying particular attention to those requiring urgent conservation measures);89 and (d) the
categorization of processes which have or likely will have "significant
adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of biological
diversity."90
The Convention recognizes the different types of conservation efforts and possibilities by establishing separate policies and procedures
for both "in-situ"91 and "ex-situ"9 2 conservation. Each Party must, to
81. Id. art. 14.6.
82. Id.
83. United Nations on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 11.
84. As defined by the Convention, "biological diversity" means "the variability among
living organisms from all sources including ... terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are apart; this includes diversity
within species, between species and of ecosystems." Id. art. 2.
85. As defined by the Convention, "sustainable use" means the use of biological resources "in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological
diversity . . .to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations." Id.
art. 3.
86. Id. art. 1. See also id. art. 5 (stating that contracting Parties, to the extent possible, should cooperate with each other in all appropriate matters and methods "for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity").
87. Id. art. 6. Such programs must integrate with existing domestic legislation and
policies. Id.
88. Id. art. 7(a). The identification should be in reference to the Convention's Annex
I, which breaks the identification into (1) ecosystems and habitats (containing high diversity, large numbers of endemic or threatened species or wilderness) and (2) species and
communities (which are threatened or of some economic, agricultural, social, cultural or
scientific importance).
89. Id. art. 7(b).
90. Id. art. 7(c).
91. In-situ conservation is defined by the Convention as the "conservation of ecosys-
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the degree possible and appropriate, do the following for in-situ conservation: (a) create a system of protected areas; 93 (b) develop guidelines
94
for the establishment and management of the protected areas; (c)
manage biological resources important to conserving biological diversity;95 (d) promote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and
the maintenance of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings; 96 (e) rehabilitate degraded ecosystems and help recover
threatened species; 97 and (f) create or maintain regulation to help pro98
tect threatened species.
For ex-situ conservation, the Convention is less demanding but requires the Parties to: (a) create mechanisms for ex-situ conservation of
components of biological diversity; 99 (b) establish facilities for ex-situ
conservation and research on plants, animals and micro-organisms; 100
(c) enact domestic measures to aid in the recovery and rehabilitation of
threatened species so they may be returned to their natural environment; 10 1 and (d) regulate the collection of biological resources from
natural habitats for ex-situ conservation purposes "so as not to threaten
' 102
ecosystems and in-situ populations."
The Convention focuses on the need for sustainable use of components for biological diversity and delineates several steps the Parties
must take, including: (a) integrating the concept of sustainable use into
national policy-making; 10 3 (b) implementing measures to minimize the

tems and natural habitats and the maintenance and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural surrounding and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in
the surroundings where they have developed their distinctive properties." Id. art. 2.
92. Ex-situ conservation is defined by the Convention as the "conservation of components of biological diversity outside their natural habitats." Id.
93. Id. art. 8(a).
94. Id. art. 8(b).
95. Id. art. 8(c). This applies to biological resources both within and outside of the
designated protected areas.
96. Id. art. 8(d). The Convention also asks for the promotion of "environmentally
sound and sustainable development in areas adjacent to protected areas with a view to
furthering protection of these areas." Id. art. 8(e).
97. Id. art. 8(f). The rehabilitation efforts are through "the development and implementation of plans or other management strategies." Id.
98. Id. art. 8(k). The steps required are many but the funding for such projects is
vague at best. Id. art. 8(k) (encouraging Parties to "cooperate in providing financial and
other support for in-situ conservation... particularly to developing countries").
99. Id. art. 9(a). The Convention encourages ex-situ conservation to be done in the
country of origin of the components. Id. art. 9(a)-(b).
100. Id. art. 9(b).
101. Id. art. 9(c).
102. Id. art. 9(d). The Convention is also vague on the financing structure for encouraging ex-situ conservation efforts. Id. art. 9(e) (encouraging cooperation in financing exsitu conservation, especially for developing countries).
103. Id. art. 10(a). One piece of domestic legislation asked of all Parties is the authori-
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damage to biological diversity caused by the use of biological resources; 104 and (c) encouraging cooperative efforts between domestic
governments and private sector actors in developing methods for sus10 5
tainable use.
As for the Convention's institutions, the Parties created the Conference of the Parties, 10 6 the Secretariat, 10 7 and the Subsidiary Body on
Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice. 108 These bodies play an
important role in dispute settlement under the Convention. If two or
more Parties have a disagreement regarding the interpretation or
application of the Convention, they are required to initially attempt
resolution by negotiation. 0 9 If negotiation fails to resolve the conflict
the Parties may request a third Party mediation. 110 Provided that
mediation brings no solution, the dispute will go before either the
International Court of Justice, an arbitration tribunal, or a conciliation
commission."' If the Parties agree to go to arbitration, they shall notify
1 2
the Secretariat of the decision. "
The arbitral tribunal will consist of three members; each of the two
Parties appoints an arbitrator and the two appointees jointly appoint

zation of access or transfer of technologies relevant to the sustainable use of biological diversity. Id. art. 16. The promotion of national policies encouraging the scientific and
technical cooperation is also stressed by the Convention. Id. art. 18.
104. Id. art. 10(b). The Convention suggests, as one minimizing measure, that Parties
use environmental impact assessments for all internal projects proposed that are likely to
have a significant adverse effect on biological diversity. Id. art. 14(1).
105. Id. art. 10(e).
106. Id. art. 23. The Conference of the Parties' duties include the adoption and
amending of rules, transmission of information to the Parties (as well as receipt of information), and reviewing advice and information given to it so as to define compliance with
the Convention. Id.
107. Id. art. 24. The Secretariat is required to perform the administrative functions
for the Convention, as well as any other functions assigned to it by the Conference of the
Parties. Id.
108. Id. art. 25. The Body's duties include the scientific assessment of biological diversity, identification of efficient technology related to conservation and sustainable use, and
providing advice on any scientific, technical, or methodological question put to it by the
Conference of the Parties.
109. id. art. 27(1).
110. Id. art. 27(2).
111. Id. art. 27(3)-(4). Before whom the continued dispute finally goes depends on
whether the Parties are both able to agree to go before either the ICJ or the Convention's
arbitration tribunal. If the Parties have not come to such an agreement then the conciliation commission is created. Id.
112. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 1. The notification will contain the disputed interpretation or application of the Convention which is in dispute (if the subject in dispute cannot
be agreed upon, the tribunal will determine the subject matter). The Secretariat will forward all collected information to all the contracting Parties. Id.
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113
the president, who cannot be a national of either Party in dispute.
The tribunal must base its decision on the content of the Convention
and international law.1 1 4 The disputing Parties must provide the
tribunal with all relevant documents and information, which may
include calling experts and other witnesses when necessary to properly
develop the issues.11 5 Failure of a disputing Party to appear or properly
defend itself before the tribunal will not be a bar to the proceedings and
the tribunal may make a final decision.1 1 6 The decision will be based on
a majority of the arbitrators 17 and will be without appeal unless the
Parties previously agreed to an appellate procedure. 118

If the Parties cannot agree to either the ICJ or an arbitration
tribunal settling the dispute, a conciliation commission is created upon
the request of one of the disputing Parties. 119 The commission consists
of five members; two appointed by each Party, with the president of the
commsission jointly elected by the four appointees.1 20 The commission
will render its "proposal for resolution of the dispute, which the Parties
12
shall consider in good faith." 1
H. NAFTA 's Supplemental Agreement on EnvironmentalCooperation
NAFTA's stance within the primary agreement was to "recoginze
that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic
health, safety or environmental measures."'122 Building on the text of
the main agreement, the Supplemental Agreement 2 3 announced the
importance of maintaining the environment in a cooperative manner
"for the well being of present and future generations."'1 24
The
Agreement's objectives include: (a) to protect and improve the
113. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 2. If the disputing Parties cannot select the president
of the tribunal, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will select the president
within a two-month period. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1 art. 3.
114. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 4. The tribunal will determine its own rules of procedure. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 5.
115. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 7.
116. Id. at Annex II,pt. 1, art. 13. Before making a final decision, the tribunal must
be satisfied that the claim is "well founded in fact and law." Id.
117. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1, art. 12.
118. Id. at Annex II, pt. 1,art. 16.
119. Id. art. 27(4).
120. Id. at Annex II, pt. 2, art. 1. If the disputing Parties cannot select the president of
the commission, the Secretary-General of the United Nations will select the president
within a two-month period. Id.
121. Id. at Annex II, pt.2, art. 5. The word "proposal" instead of "decision" may make
the outcome seem less determinative than that of the arbitration tribunal, which gives
"final decisions." Id. at. Annex II, pt. 1, art. 13.
122. North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1114, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 605
(1993).
123. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supranote 12.
124. Id. at Preamble.
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25
environment for "well-being of present and future generations"; (b) to
promote sustainable development through cooperative efforts in
implementing environmental and economic policies; 126 (c) to increase
the enforcement and compliance of environmental laws and regulations;' 27 and (d) to avoid creating barriers to trade or trade distor1 28

tions.

To best fulfill the Agreement's objectives, the Parties resolved to
commit themselves generally to: (a) preparing and publicly releasing
129
reports on the condition of the environment within their boundaries;
(b) developing environmental emergency procedures;' 30 (c) educating
the public on environmental matters; 131 (d) assessing environmental
impacts; 132 and (e) promoting economic tools to effectively achieve envi33
ronmental goals. 1
The Parties agreed to the above obligations with the condition that
each Party establish its own level of environmental protection and environmental policies. 3 4 Though it may seem to thwart harmonization
under the Agreement, the Parties also committed that such domestic
regulation would "provide for high levels of environmental protection
135
and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations."'
After announcing such preeminence of internal legislation, the Agree136
ment outlines particular government action required of the Parties,
including: (a) effective enforcement of its environmental laws and
regulations; 137 (b) the existence of judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings for sanctions or remedies related to violations under its
environmental laws and regulations;' 38 and (c) the allocation of appro125. Id. art. 1(a).
126. Id. art. 1(b). The polices would be enacted by and under the supervision of the
domestic mechanisms of the Parties to the Agreement. Id. art. 1(b)-(f).
127. Id. art. l(g).
128. Id. art. 1(e).
129. Id. art. 2.1(a). The Agreement also requires Parties to ensure that its domestic
laws and regulations relating to any matter covered in the Agreement must be published.
To the extent possible, the Parties should allow notice of prospective measures it may
adopt and a reasonable opportunity for interested persons to comment. Id. art. 4.
130. Id. art. 2.1(b).
131. Id. art. 2.1(c).
132. Id. art. 2.1(e).
133. Id. art. 2.1(f).
134. Id. art. 3.
135. Id.
136. Id. art. 5.
137. Id. art. 5.1. Examples of "effective enforcement" are given, including: appointing
inspectors, monitoring compliance and investigations of suspected violations, promoting
environmental audits, requiring record keeping and reporting, using licenses (permits or
authorizations), initiating proceedings to seek appropriate sanctions or remedies for violations (including emergency orders), or providing for search, seizure or detention. Id.
138. Id. art. 5.2. The Agreement requires the ability of private interested persons to
have access to the proceedings. The private person's rights would include the ability to
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priate sanctions and remedies for violations of its environmental laws
39
and regulations.'
The Agreement established the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation to oversee the implementation and administration of the
announced objectives and criteria. l40 The Commission consists of a
Council, a Secretariat and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.' 4 ' The
Counci' 42 convenes at least once a year 143 and may use wide discretion
145
in deciding what procedures to apply 144 and what action it may take.
The Council acts as the governing body of the Commission 146 and its
functions are to: (a) serve as a forum for environmental matters; 147 (b)
supervise the implementation of the Agreement as well as recommend
elaborations to strengthen the agreement;' 48 (c) oversee the Secretariat; 149 (d) address "questions and differences that may arise between the
50
Parties regarding the interpretation or application of the Agreement";'
(e) consider and develop recommendations for the Agreement's
functions;11 (f) strengthen Parties' cooperation for improving
environmental laws and regulations; 5 2 (g) promote public access to
environmental information;' 53 (h) cooperate with the NAFTA Free

sue another person, seek sanctions or remedies to mitigate environmental damage, and
request authorities to enforce the domestic environmental laws and regulations. Id.
139. Id. art. 5.3. A Party must consider the nature and gravity of the violation, any
economic benefit derived from the violation, and the economic position of the violator.
Compliance agreements, fines, imprisonment, closure of facilities and the cost of containing or cleaning up the pollution are possible sanctions to be imposed. Id.
140. Id. art. 8.1.
141. Id. art. 8.2.
142. The Council "shall comprise cabinet-level or equivalent representatives of the
Parties or their designees." Id. art. 9.1.
143. Id. art. 3.
144. Id. art. 2.
145. Id. art. 5. The council may assign responsibilities to ad hoc or standing committees, seek advice of non-governmental organizations or persons, and take such action "in
the exercise of its functions as the Parties may agree." Id.
146. Id. art. 10.1.
147. Id. art. 10.1(a).
148. Id. art. 10.1(b). The Council will review the effectiveness of the Agreement four
years after the entry into force. Id.
149. Id. art. 10.1(c).
150. Id. art. 10.1(d).
151. Id. art. 10.2. The Council may develop recommendations on a broad spectrum of
possible subjects, including: techniques and methodologies for gathering data and analysis; environmental matters as they relate to economic development; protection of endangered species and habitats; approaches to environmental enforcement; and "any other
matters it may decide." Id.
152. Id. art. 10.3. The Agreement encourages the exchange of information on developing environmental standards with the goal of harmonizing such standards. Id.
153. Id. art. 10.5. This would include public participation in the decision-making process. Id.
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Trade Commission to discourage Parties from waiving environmental
measures;154 (i) create a system that oversees Parties' national policies
with environmental impact assessments;1 55 and (j) develop proper
56
access and remedies for a Party who has suffered an injury.
The Secretariat fulfills the Agreement's needs for an informationgatherer and record-maker. Every year the Secretariat prepares a
report of the Commission 5 7 which is ultimately released to the public. 158 Questions over a Party's non-enforcement of its environmental
laws and regulations result in the Secretariat investigating the matter.15 9 The Secretariat "may consider a submission from any nongovernmental organization (NGO) or person asserting that a Party is
failing to effectively enforce its environmental law."' 60 To be considered
by the Secratariat, the submission must contain "sufficient information
to allow the Secretariat to review the submissions, including
documentary evidence on which the submission may be based"1 61 and
appear to be "aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing
industry."162 Notification of the complaint must be made to the accused
Party163 and the person or NGO must reside or exist in the territory of a
164
Party to the Agreement.
When the Secretariat acknowledges that a submitted complaint
fufills the set criteria it will determine the necessity of a response from
the accused Party. 165 If the accussed Party notifies the Secretariat that
the matter is "the subject of a pending judicial or administrative

154. Id. art. 10.6.
155. Id. art. 10.7.
156. Id. art. 10.9. The injured Party would need proper redress in the violating Party's
adjudicative systems, as if the injury had been caused within the violator's own territory.

Id.
157. Id. art. 12.1. The report covers many areas of interest: the activities and expense
of the Commission, actions taken by each Party (including enforcement data), views of
non-governmental organization (or persons), and recommendations made on any matter.
Id. art. 12.2. If the Secretariat wishes to prepare a report on a matter within the scope of
the annual program it may, unless two-thirds of the Parties object to the creation of such
a report. Id. The report may not concern itself over a Party's lack of enforcement of its
environmental laws. Id.
158. Id. art. 12.1.
159. Id. art. 14.1.
160. Id.
161. Id. art. 14.1(c).
162. Id. art. 14.1(d).
163. Id. art. 14.1(e). The submission must also include any response the accused Party
has made to the complaint. Id.
164. Id. art. 14.1(f0.
165. Id. art. 14.2. The Secretariat will determine necessity of response based upon
whether: (1) the submission alleges harm to the complaining Party; (2) the submission
requires study that advances goals of the Agreement; (3) private remedies under the accused Party's law have been exhausted; and (4) the submission is drawn exclusively from
mass media reports. Id.

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 26:5

proceeding" the Secretariat must stop the investigation. 166 The accused
Party shall submit any information it wishes if no internal proceedings
are in progress. 167 The Secretariat may proceed further, with the
consent of the Council, 168 by developing a factual record 169 using a wide
array of sources for information. 170 It shall submit a draft to the
Council and any Party may provide commentary on the record's
171
accuracy after the Secretariat compiles the factual record.
The Agreement creates the Joint Public Advisory Committee
(JPAC)172 whose duties include: (a) advising the Council on any matter
within the scope of the agreement, as well as implementing and
elaborating on the agreement; 173 (b) providing relevant information to
the Secretariat to assist in developing factual records;174 and (c) any
175
other duties required by the Council.
The Agreement contains an elaborate and innovative structure for
dispute settlement that begins with consultation. 176 Any Party may
request a consultation with another Party "regarding whether there has
been a persistant pattern of failure ...to effectively enforce its
environmental law."' 77 All interested Parties are allowed to participate
in the consultation1 78 and shall "make every attempt to arrive at a
' 79
mutually satisfactory resolution of the matter through consultations."'
A special session of the Council may be requested if consultations
fail to resolve the dispute within sixty days of a Party's request for a
consultation.1 80 The Party requesting the special session will submit,

166. Id. art. 14.3
167. Id. art. 14.3(b). This includes any previous action or remedies given by the accused Party relating to the matter. Id.
168. Id. art. 15.2. The Council must authorize the preparation of a factual record by a
two-thirds vote. Id.
169. Id. art. 15.1. The Secretariat must consider whether "the submission, in the light
of any response provided by the Party, warrants developing a factual record." Id.
170. Id. art. 15.4. The Secretariat may consider any information "furnished by a Party
and may consider any relevant technical, scientific, or other information" that is: (a) publicly available; (b) submitted by an interested NGO or person; (c) submitted by the Joint
Public Advisory Committee; or (d) developed by the Secretariat or by independent experts.

Id.
171. Id. art. 15.5. The Parties commenting have 45 days after the Secretariat submits
the draft record to the Council. Id.
172. Id. art. 16.1. The Parties will appoint an equal number of the fifteen members to
the Committee. Id.
173. Id. art. 16.4.
174. Id. art. 16.5.
175. Id. art. 16.4.
176. Id. art. 22.
177. Id. art. 22.1.
178. Id. art. 22.3.
179. Id. art. 22.4.
180. Id. art. 23.1.
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with their request, a description of the dispute. 181 The Council, unless
otherwise decided, will convene within twenty days of the request and
attempt to resolve the issue. 182 In resolving the dispute, the Council
may:
(a) call on such technical advisers or create such working groups
or expert groups as it deems necessary;
(b) have recourse to good offices, conciliation, mediation or such
other dispute resolution procedures; or
(c) make a recommendation, as may assist the consulting Parties
to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute. Any such
recommendations shall be made public if the Council, by a two-thirds
183
vote, so decides.
Provided the Council cannot resolve the matter sixty days after the
convening of the special session, it may consider creating an aribitral
panel.1 84 An interested Party must request the panel and the Council
must approve the panel by a two-thirds majority.18 5 The agreement
limits disputes to failures of enforcement "involving workplaces, firms,
companies or sectors that produce goods or services"1 86 that are involved
with trade among the Parties or compete with "goods or services
1 87
produced or provided by persons of another Party."
The Council, after approving the dispute for arbitration, will
establish a roster of forty-five individuals who are able to serve as
panelists.188
The rosters members must have experience in
environmental law or international dispute settlement, or have relevant
professional expertise or experience.189
The chosen panel consists of five members whose selection depends
upon the number of Parties involved in the arbitration.1 90 Each Party
selects two panelists who are citizens of the opposing Party when there
are two disputing Parties. 91 When there are more than two Parties,
the Party complained against selects two panelists whose citizenry is
from different complaining Parties.' 92 The complaining Parties must
select two panelists whose citizenry is from the complained against

181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

art. 23.2.
art. 23.3.
art. 23.4.
art. 24.1.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. art. 25.1.
Id. art. 25.2.
Id. art. 27.
ld. art. 27.1.
Id. art. 27.2.
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Party. 193
The panel, either upon request by a Party or by its own initiative,
"may seek information and technical advice from any person or body
that it deems appropriate."'194 This seemingly broad power is curtailed
by disputing Parties who retain the power to limit this investigative
power of the panel "to such terms and conditions as such Parties may
agree."' 95 The panel must present an initial report to the disputing
Parties within 180 days after panelist selection. The panel's initial
report contains: (a) findings of fact; (b) its ruling as to whether there
has been a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce
environmental law; and (c) the panel's recommendation, if any, for
196
resolution of the dispute.
After the disputing Parties are given an opportunity to comment
and to request reconsideration of the initial report, 9 7 the panel will give
the disputing Parties a final report that will be subsequently published. 198 If the panel found a persistent pattern of failure to effectively
enforce environmental law, the disputing Parties may agree on an
action plan to eliminate such failure. 99 The panel may be reconvened if
the disputing Parties cannot agree to an action plan2 ° ° or agree that an
20 1
action plan is being fully implemented.
If the panel reconvenes to resolve disagreement over a proposed
action plan, the panel will determine the sufficiency of the proposed
action plan to remedy the pattern of non-enforcement.2 02 If found
insufficient, the panel may impose monetary enforcement assessment
20 3
within ninety days after the panel reconvenes.

193. Id. When settling disputes between two or more Parties, the Parties must agree
on the chair to the panel. If such agreement cannot be reached, a Party will be chosen
randomly and it will be allowed to select the chair (the chair cannot be a citizen of the
randomly chosen Party). Id.
194. Id. art. 30.
195. Id.
196. Id. art. 31. This normally is the required adoption of an action plan that remedies
the pattern of non-enforcement.
197. Id. art. 31.5.
198. Id. art. 32. The report will be published five days after it is transmitted to the
Council. Id.
199. Id. art. 33. The Parties must notify the Secretariat and the Council of any agreed
resolution of the dispute.
200. Id. art. 34. The disputing Parties cannot agree on an action plan within sixty
days of the final report.
201. Id. The implementation dispute may be over an action plan agreed to by the Parties or one established by the panel.
202. Id. art. 34.4. If the panel does not approve the plan it may create one consistent
with the Party's domestic laws. Id.
203. Id. art. 34.4. The Council deposits all funds generated by the monetary enforcement assessment into a fund that improves and enhances the environment or environmental law enforcement in the Party complained against. Id. at Annex 34.
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If the panel reconvenes to determine whether a complained against
Party is fully implementing an action plain, the panel will decide on the
questioned implementation. 204 The panel may not impose a monetary
enforcement assessment if it finds that the plan is being fully
implemented. 2 5 The panel shall impose a monetary enforcement
assessment within sixty days after the panel reconvenes if full
20 6
implementation has not been established.
A complaining Party to a dispute may annually suspend the
NAFTA benefits when a complained against Party fails to pay the
207
monetary enforcement assesment within 180 days of the judgment.
The suspension of benefits cannot exceed the monetary enforcement
assessment. 208 Where the dispute involved more than one complaining
Party, the suspension of benefits will be calculated in the aggregate and
the sum of the suspensions cannot exceed the monetary enforcement
assessment. 209 The suspension of the benefits will cease when the Party
pays the monetary enforcement assessment or begins to fully
210
implement the action plan.
III. THE ENVIRONMENT VS. THE ECONOMY
As estimated by the U.S. Trade Representative Office in 1993,
NAFTA creates the world's largest market 21 1 and will stimulate
economic growth for the members to the agreement. 212 But with the
increased economic activity come fears of environmental degredation
and the belief that rapid growth will outpace environmental

204. Id. art. 34.5.
205. Id.
206. Id. In addition to the monetary assessment, the panel will require full implementation of the action plan. Id. To determine the amount of the monetary enforcement assessment the panel should look at: (a) the duration and degree of the Party's persistent
pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental law; (b) the enforcement level
reasonably expected of a Party, considering its resources; (c) the Party's reasons for not
fully implementing an action plan; (d) effort made by the Party to begin remedying the
non-enforcement; and (e) any other relevant factors. Id. at Annex 34.
207. Id. art. 36. The first year of the Agreement, any monetary enforcement assessment could not exceed twenty million dollars (U.S.). For the years following, the assessment cannot exceed .007 percent of the total trade in goods between the Parties during
the most recent year for which data is available. Id. at Annex 34.
208. Id. art. 36.2.
209. Id. art. 36.3.
210. Id. art. 36.4. The panel may be requested to reconvene to determine if the suspension of benefits is "manifestly excessive." The panel will present its decision in a report to the disputing Parties within forty-five days of the request. Id. art. 36.5.
211. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF NAFTA (1994).
The market will consist of over 370 million people and $6.5 trillion of production.
212. Id.
The Trade Representative Office predicted an increase of U.S. exportsupported jobs by 200,000 in the first two years and one percent increase to the Mexican
growth rate. Id. at 1.
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infrastructure. 213
One concern lies with Mexico's ability to enforce its environmental
laws and whether free trade will result in Canadian and U.S.
14
businesses sponsoring the lackluster enforcement in pursuit of profit.2
Many environmentalists point to the current maquiladoraindustry as a
road sign to where free trade will take North America. 215 Sparked by
the Mexican economic crisis of 1982, maquiladora employment
216
increased at the rate of fifteen percent a year during the mid-1980s.
The present rate of employment does not rival previous levels, yet it
grows at a high rate as do the exports derived from the industry. 217
Industry and populations have been drawn to the border area to take
advantage of the economic benefits. 218 The increased industrial activity
and population, without environmental protection mechanisms
21 9
established or enforced, resulted in the poisoning of the environment.

213. Jagdish Bhagwati & Herman E. Daly, Debate: Does Free Trade Harm the Environment?, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Nov. 1993, at 41.
214. DANIEL MAGRAW, NAFTA & THE ENVIRONMENT 4 (1995). The fear is that Mexico
would become a "pollution haven" where businesses would be attracted to low levels of
environmental protection to save production costs. Id.
215. The maquiladora program allows components to be imported duty-free into Mexico from the United States for further manufacturing by border factories and then exported duty-free back into the United States (a twin factory is created on the border, with
the production side in Mexico). Id. at 5.
216. Edward J. Williams, The MaquiladoraIndustry and Environmental Degradation
In the United States-Mexico Borderlands,27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 765, 766 (1996).
217. Id. The first ten months of 1995 displayed an increase of maquiladora employment by 9.4% with maquiladora exports increasing by 19.2%. The exports for the first
quarter of 1996 increased 12% since the first quarter of 1995.
218. Electronic industries increased their presence, from 1979 to 1985, by 65% and account for 85% of maquiladora employment. Between 1984 and 1988, the chemical industry increased employment from 272 to 1674 workers. From 1980 to 1990, the number of
furniture industry plants increased from 59 to 274 resulting in the addition of 22,000
workers. Id. at 776.
219. Id. Everything from raw sewage to hazardous wastes has been dumped into the
local environment. The Mexican government admits that over 28,000 tons of hazardous
waste produced by the maquiladora industry is not accounted for in 1995. Id. The
authors cite Polly Chaz, America's Deadly Border, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Dec. 12, 1993, at
16, who reports that children play in pools of toxic green scum and hazardous waste is
dumped by local factories onto the streets. Id. at n.33. For more detail on the problems
resulting from the maquiladora industry, see Jane Kay, The "Toxic Dump" that Flows into
California,S.F. EXAMINER, June 22, 1986, at 7 (reporting that ground water is highly contaminated, as is the New River, which flows from Mexico into California and "contains
every disease known in the Western hemisphere"); Michael Scott Feeley & Elizabeth
Knier, Environmental Considerationsof the Emerging United States-Mexico Free Trade
Agreement, 2 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 259 (1992) (stating that the pollution of the water
is so high that 90% of adults thirty-five or older in the towns near San Elizario, Mexico
contract hepatitis during their lifetimes); and Paulette L. Stenzel, Can NAFTA's Environmental Provisions Promote Sustainable Development?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 423, 446 (1995)
(stating that in Ciudad Juarez, a ditch filled with untreated household and industrial
sewage carries over one million gallons of waste a day into the Rio Grande).
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The example given by the maquiladora industry begins the list of
environmental problems tied to industrialization. Acid rain stands as
another concern related to North American industry. 220 Pollution along
the U.S.-Canadian border poses a special problem due its size 221 and
population concentration along it.222 History marks notable increased
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide (two pollutants linked to
acid rain) during the last fifty years in North America. 223 The increase
of the pollutants traces directly back to rising power plant and motor
vehicle emissions. 224 The short-term effects of acid rain include the destruction of many species populations and various aquatic ecosystems. 225 The long-term effects are debatable, but many studies suggest
permanent damage to agriculture (damage to soil, root systems, and
microorganisms), urban damage (erosion of stone, paint and metals),
and hazards to human health (ingestion of water and food affected by
226
acid rain).
Both the maquiladora industry and the increased levels of acid rain
display pollution's lack of deference to national boundaries and the increased levels of pollution associated with economic growth. 227 The environmentalists' wariness seems logical since the purpose of NAFTA is
to stimulate industrial activity and economic prosperity. Whether the
Side Agreement contains sufficient incentives and enforcement powers
deserves attention and will be discussed below.

220. In 1986, the annual rainfall in the eastern half of the U.S. was estimated to be
ten to forty times more acidic than normal rainfall, with manmade pollutants the source
of the acidity. Jeffrey L. Roelofs, United States-CanadaAir Quality Agreement: A Framework for Addressing TransboundaryAir Pollution Problems, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 421,
422 n.6 (1993).
221. The two countries share approximately 5,000 miles of border and more than 150
lakes and rivers. Brian R. Popiel, Comment: From Customary Law to Environmental Impact Assessment: A New Approach to Avoiding Transboundary Environmental Damage
Between Canadaand the United States, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 447 (1995).
222. Almost 90% of all Canadians live within one hundred miles of the U.S.-Canadian
border. Id.
223. As of the early 1980s, annual sulfur dioxide emissions for the U.S. equaled approximately 26 million tons, a 26% increase since 1946, while nitrogen oxide emissions
totaled 23 million tons as of 1980. Canada's annual emission of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide were, respectively, 5 million tons and 2 million tons. Roelofs, supra note 220, at
422.
224. More than 90% of acid rain is due to man-made emissions of sulfur oxide and nitrogen oxides (sulfur oxide causes two-thirds of the problem). Id. at 421.
225. Id. at 423 (citing ACID RAIN AND FRIENDLY NEIGHBORS: THE POLICY DISPUTE
BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (Jurgen Schmandt & Hilliard Roderick eds.,
1988)).
226. Id. at 423-24.
227. Some scholars suggest several of NAFTA's potential threats to the environment,
including- declining domestic environmental standards; deteriorating air and water quality; eroding of physical infrastructure within Mexico; and increasing mishandling of hazardous waste. Feeley & Knier, supranote 219, at 6-8.
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A. The Side-Agreement's Shortcomings
The directives of the Side Agreement require enforcement of domestic environmental laws and regulations. Critics of the Agreement
attack this objective, arguing that baseline levels of environmental protection must be established. 228 Without requiring environmental standard harmonization it is feared that Mexico will sacrifice continued en229
vironmental protection in an effort to entice businesses to relocate.
Critics raise the ability for a Party to side-track enforcement procedures 230 and the ease which a Party may withdraw from the Agreement 23 1 as other weak areas of the Convention. The Council, which set-

tles disputes under the Agreement, consists of political appointees and
has a myriad of procedures to delay any adjudication of conflicts. 232 A
Party must only give notice and wait six months to withdraw from the
Agreement. 233 Critics argue that Parties' behavior will change only
234
when obligations are not easily circumvented or dischargeable.
Critics also find fault with the limited access and remedies involved
with the dispute resolution mechanisms of the Agreement. 235 The
Agreement allows for private remedies for those who have, as deter236
mined by Parties' environmental laws, a "legally recognized interest."
This gives non-citizens difficulty in finding sufficient standing to bring
237
cross-border suits and complicates the enforcement of the Agreement.
If a private actor has a sufficient interest to bring suit, the person or or-

228. See Farah Khakee, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Need to Protect Transboundary Water Resources, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 848, 880 (1993). The idea of
global standardization of environmental policies has been argued long before the creation
of NAFTA. See Developments in the Law - InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1484, 1609 (1991) (discussing the concept of extraterritorial environmental regulation to cover those nations whose environmental regulation lacks substance).
229. Alicia A. Samios, NAFTAs Supplemental Agreement: In Need of Reform, 9 N.Y.
INT'L L.R. 49 (1996) (reviewing Mexico's history of lax enforcement as reason to doubt the
strength of the Agreement); see also Khakee, supra note 228, at 880 (detailing the deficiencies of Mexican, Canadian, and U.S. domestic legislation).
230. David S. Baron, NAFTA and the Environment - Making the Side Agreement
Work, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 603, 604 (1995).
231. Samios, supranote 229, at 67.
232. Baron, supra note 230, at 604. The obstacle most obvious is the bar put on any
dispute that is currently "subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding."
Supplemental Agreement, supra note 12, art. 14.3(a).
233. Supplemental Agreement, supranote 11, art. 50.
234. Samios, supra note 229, at 67.
235. Id. at 69.
236. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 12, art. 6.2.
237. Samios, supra note 229, at 69. In interpreting the standing requirements of the
Agreement, one scholar suggests the disregarding of U.S. Supreme Court's view of
standing. Baron, supra note 230, at 610 (claiming the U.S. approach to standing "leads to
enormously complex and costly litigation to no productive end[s]"). Id.
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ganization may only submit a complaint to the Secretariat. 238 The Secretariat can investigate the matter more thoroughly only after two of
the three Parties consent to such an investigation. 239 This politicizes
240
the alleged injury and may hinder the resolution of disputes.
Finally, critics object to the limited subject matter allowed in dispute settlement 241 and the sanctioning mechanisms to enforce decisions
under the Agreement. 242 The Agreement limits the scope of arbitration
to matters relating to "workplaces, firms, companies or sectors, that
produce goods or provide services: (a) traded between the... Parties; or
(b) that compete ...with goods or services produced or provided by person of another Party."243 This arguably limits the environmental protection to commercial areas and allows private disregard of environ244
mental laws.
If the dispute falls within these parameters, the imposition of trade
sanctions (or monetary assessments) to enforce the decision may be
counter-productive. 245 The Agreement allows trade sanctions for "persistent and unjustifiable pattern[s] of non-enforcement." 246 But such a
pattern lacks objective definition and would likely result in arbitrarily
imposed sanctions. 247 Even if objective criteria could be achieved it may
not be desirable. The narrow focus to heighten environmental enforcement might be at the cost of Mexico's infrastructure. 248 The requirement
of similar levels of environmental enforcement may be unrealistic when
one considers the disparity of economic development between Mexico
and its northern partners. To comply with the Agreement's enforcement conditions, Mexico may have to sacrifice its spending on important infrastructure projects (such as sewers). 249 What may result is less
238. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 11, art. 14.
239. Id. art. 15(2).
240. Samios, supra note 229, at 71 (concluding that the agreement fails to promote
public participation in developing environmental laws, regulations and policies). Id.; see
also id. at 73 (complaining that the "broad sovereignty-protection clauses as ripe for manipulation by the Party-governments").
241. Id. at 72.

242. Nicolas Kublicki, The Greening of Free Trade: NAFTA, Mexican Environmental
Law, and Debt Exchanges for Mexican Environmental Infrastructure Development, 19
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 59 (1994).

243. Supplemental Agreement, supra note 12, art. 24(1).
244. Samios, supra note 229, at 72 (claiming that the Agreement is not able to assess
sufficiency of environmental laws).
245. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 112-113.
246. Id.
Kublicki argues that "persistent and unjustifiable pattern of nonenforcement" will be interpreted at a level commensurate with that of Canada and the
U.S. Id. at 111.
247. Id. at 111.
248. Id. at 113.
249. Id. at 115. The author cites a columnist who writes: "How can a country that has
been unable even to clean up its own drinking water - and still uses vast quantities of
pesticides that are banned in the United States - comply with far-higher U.S. environ-
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development in the name of enforcement which may leave the environment worse off than before the Agreement. 250 Focusing narrowly on enforcement raises several concerns, including: (a) the formation of an adversarial relationship between business and government; 25 1 (b)
compliance with regulation will be the focus of business instead of conserving resources; 252 and (c) the absence of mechanisms within Mexico
253
to enforce the regulations.
B. The Side-Agreement's Strengths
Despite the criticisms, many environmentalists find the SideAgreement to procure considerable power in preserving the environment and enforcing domestic regulation. 2 4 Supporters hold out the
Agreement as marking "the first time in international trade agreements
255
the environment is incorporated as a significant factor."
The Agreement protects more stringent national environmental
standards from erosion by emphasizing concepts of national autonomy. 256 This prevents the atrophy of higher domestic standards in or257
der to create harmonized international standards.
Supporters also point to improvements in domestic environmental
infrastructure as another strength of the Agreement. 258 The increased
economic benefits derived from free trade would allow for proper monitoring, air and water treatment, and education needed to properly en-

mental standards?" Id. at n.249 (citing Harold Gilliam, Will Clinton Put the Earth First?,
SAN FRAN. CHRON., Jan. 31, 1993, at 4).

250, Id. at 115.
251. C. Foster Knight, Comment: Voluntary Environmental Standards vs. Mandatory
EnvironmentalRegulations and Enforcement in the NAFTA Market, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L. &
COMP. LAW 619, 629 (1995).
252. Id.
253. Id. The ability for private enforcement is mostly missing within Mexican environmental law. Id. at n.36. The author suggests the implementation of voluntary compliance with the international environmental standards as the best method of harmonizing standards and enhancing compliance with those standards. Id. at 634.
254. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 69.
255. Id. (quoting Jay D. Hair, President of the National Wildlife Federation).
256. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 12, art. 3
(holding that each Party has the right to "establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental development policies and priorities"). See also
Sanford E. Gaines, Environmental Laws and Regulations After NAFTA, 1 U.S. MEXICO
L.J. 199, 204 (1993); Kublicki, supra note 242, at 70.
257. Id. The Parties are to ensure that its laws are enforced and must "strive to improve those laws and regulations." Id. This will leave intact the high requirements already established in the United States and Canada, while encouraging development
within Mexico's legislation. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 30-32.
258. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 65.
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force environmental regulation. 259 Infrastructure development would
institutionalize environmental protection through public projects, as
well as environmental education. 260 Developing infrastructure would
alleviate the problems of international enforcement while avoiding sovereignty conflicts caused by trade sanctions or fines. 261 It is asserted by
supporters that with economic prosperity comes a cleaner environment;
those who are wealthier can afford more efficient technologies and pollution control. 262 With the proper revenues, infrastructure can be improved (or created). 263 Though an inverse relation may not exist between the economic prosperity and environmental degradation,
economic growth is a logical prerequisite to environmental protection in
developing countries.264
The Agreement allows considerable public participation within the
Agreement, especially in dispute-resolution processes. 265 It requires notification of a government's change in food safety measures, 266 on which
the public is then allowed to comment. 267 It is ground-breaking in that
it encourages private citizens to submit complaints. 268 Despite the political nature of arbitration, 269 no other environmental agreement al270
lows such private access.
Arguments that the Agreement will encourage business to relocate
to Mexico are rebuffed by stating that such relocation was not prohibited prior to NAFTA.271 Supporters point out that NAFTA discourages
272
environmentally motivated relocation.

259. Id.
260. Id. at 65-66.

261. Id.
262. Id. at 106-107 (citing Jonathon Marshal, How Ecology Is Tied To Mexico Trade
Pact, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 25, 1992, at A8 (reporting about a Princeton study by Gene
Grossman and Alan Krueger showing that pollution levels rise steadily until income
reaches beyond $4,000 per capita, and then pollution falls off as income increases beyond
$4,000). Mexico's per capita income in 1992 was $5,000. Id.
263. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 66.
264. Id. at 107.
265. Stenzel, supranote 219, at 478 (1995).
266. North American Free Trade Agreement, supranote 122, art. 718.
267. Id.
268. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 12, art. 14
269. See Samios, supra note 229, at 71.
270. See Stenzel, supra note 219, at 478.
271. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 102.
272. North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 122, art. 1114.2 (stating that
a "Party should not waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from such [environmental] measures as an encouragement").
Supporters of the
Agreement state that environmental regulation is a minor consideration when deciding
where to locate a business or factory. Kublicki, supra note 242, at 104. Labor costs,
transportation costs, raw material costs, labor skill, and corporate good will all must also
be considered. Id. Normally environmental regulation costs average 3% of total output of
industries that pollute the most. Id. at 103.
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While critics believe the Agreement falls short of what is currently
needed, 273 supporters claim that the Agreement's potential to enforce
environmental protection with economic incentive makes the Agreement uniquely powerful. 274 The creation of jobs and higher wages may
275
be the environment's most effective protection.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The landscape of international environmental protection and dispute resolution has changed markedly since 1982. Several Conventions
and agreements later, the North American countries can no longer
question the existence of procedures able to deal with environmental
damage. Instead, the U.S., Canada and Mexico must weigh the many
possible rights and obligations under the discussed agreements and decide what actions would be most effective. The agreements balance
sovereignty and community with the hope of attaining responsible independence. The mechanisms for resolving environmental disputes often sacrifice binding force in favor of cooperative efforts. While weak
enforcement and limited applicability haunt these dispute mechanisms,
the development of trade sanctions and/or fines opens new possibilities
for future agreements.
North American countries currently have the framework to change
a neighbor's behavior through any one of the discussed agreements.
The wealth of procedure indicates a growing awareness of the environment's importance and an increased desire to encourage sustainable
development. Improvements must be made in defining a Party's obligations to the environment and outlining the steps necessary to correct a
nation's behavior. Yet, the great progress made in the last seventeen
years must be recognized and respected if further agreements are to occur.

273. See, e.g., Samios, supra note 229.
274. Stenzel, supra note 219, at 478.
275. Id. at 467-68 (noting that Jay D. Hair, president of the National Wildlife Federation stated "the means of addressing environmental concerns are directly tied to economic
development. If environmental progress is not to remain solely the property of affluent
nations, developing nations must have their fair shot at progress.").

